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Employment Research
in the United States. The proportion
of recipients working increased
substantially, and employment also was
more prevalent among those leaving
welfare. However, the kinds of jobs
obtained by welfare recipients did not
change dramatically. Expected earnings
and job stability remained low for most
recipients of cash assistance, and few of
the jobs recipients landed could assure
economic self-sufﬁciency.
Despite the poor prospects offered
by the average welfare recipient’s job,
we ﬁnd evidence that some jobs do offer
greater opportunities. Even recipients
who have had a string of dead-end or
short-lived jobs may ultimately be able
to obtain a job providing a reasonable
chance for economic self-sufﬁciency.
Federal and state reforms of the
1990s have not altered this dynamic
signiﬁcantly. The goal of reduced
dependency has been attained in that
fewer individuals now receive cash aid
and more are working. But there is no
evidence that reform has substantially
improved the lives of recipients or former
recipients.
Congress continues to struggle with
reauthorizing the Personal Responsibility
Act, having passed a series of temporary
extensions since the Act expired at the
end of September 2002. Yet differences
between the House and Senate over
work and participation requirements,
allowable activities, and other issues
have been substantial enough to keep
those bodies from succeeding in crafting
new legislation. Our research supports
the view that the reforms of the 1990s
were successful in moving individuals
off the welfare rolls and into jobs. But
if the ultimate goal is economic selfsufﬁciency and not simply reductions in
“dependency,” revisions of the program
will need to go far beyond the reforms
currently envisioned.
Notes
1. Our analysis uses data from the county
containing the central city. For convenience, we
refer to each area by the city name.
2. This ﬁgure is the sum of earnings for as long
as the job lasts, up to eight quarters, with earnings
adjusted for inﬂation and reported in 1999 fourthquarter dollars.
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Refundable Tax Credits
for Health Insurance
NOTE: This article summarizes David W.
Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury’s
“Refundable Tax Credits for Health Insurance:
The Sensitivity of Simulated Impacts to Assumed
Behavior,” Upjohn Institute Working Paper
05-119, 2005. See http://www.upjohninstitute.org/
publications/wp/05-119.pdf.

Dissatisfaction with the level
and growth of the share of the U.S.
population without health insurance
has spurred interest in alternatives to
the existing system of ﬁnancing health
care, which is dominated by employerprovided health insurance among the
nonpoor and nonelderly. One approach
to reform would be to adopt a refundable
tax credit for health insurance under
the federal personal income tax. Such a
policy would grant a tax credit up to a
prespeciﬁed maximum—for example,
$1,000 for an individual or $2,000 for a

Clearly, these wide simulated
ranges highlight the uncertainty
inherent in modeling the effects
of health insurance tax credits.
family—on a tax return where the ﬁler
purchased a private, nonemployer health
insurance policy. For ﬁlers whose tax
bill was less than the amount paid for
insurance, the difference between the tax
bill and the credit would be paid to the
ﬁler—hence, the refundable nature of the
tax credit.
The refundable tax credit is attractive
for at least two reasons. First, it would
make the same tax-favored treatment
of health insurance available to all
individuals, regardless of whether
they are employed and regardless of
whether their employer provides a
health insurance plan. As a result, it
should increase the number of insured
individuals and decrease uninsurance.
Second, a tax credit would generate
growth in the market for private
nonemployer health insurance and

increase the population of health care
consumers that have an interest in
the characteristics and cost of their
coverage. These informed, cost-conscious
consumers could put a brake on
increasing health care costs.
The extent to which a tax credit for
health insurance would reduce the
number of uninsured individuals has been
controversial. Pauly, Song, and Herring
(2001) and others have simulated a
variety of different tax credit policies and
have found that a “reasonably generous”
credit could reduce the number of
uninsured individuals on the order of 50
percent. However, simulations by Gruber
(2000a,b) suggest that a health insurance
tax credit might reduce the number of
uninsured by only about 10 percent.
Here, we summarize a recent study
replicating and extending Gruber’s
simulations (Emmons, Madly, and
Woodbury 2005). Our goal is to
illuminate Gruber’s modeling of health
insurance coverage under a tax credit and
to examine the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the model’s key parameters;
that is, we want to understand what
makes the simulation model tick. The
ﬁndings from this exercise are most
relevant to Gruber’s widely discussed
ﬁndings and to the particular tax credit
analyzed. The simulations should not be
interpreted as being relevant to proposals
that, for example, would cover different
populations, would apply tax credits of a
different amount, or would eliminate the
exclusion of employer contributions for
employees’ health insurance premiums
from employees’ taxable income.
Outline of the Simulation Model
The simulation model we use is
essentially a set of rules for determining
whether a given individual (or family)
would take up a federal refundable tax
credit of $1,000 (for a single individual)
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or $2,000 (for a family) for privately
purchased health insurance. We follow
Gruber in identifying four groups, each
facing different circumstances with
respect to health insurance:
1) those currently covered by employerprovided group health insurance,
2) those covered by private
nonemployer insurance,
3) those covered by Medicaid,
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Table 1 Results of Simulation: Group Take-Up Rates, Number of Individuals
Accepting Tax Credit, and Total Net Government Cost of Tax Credit

Take-up rate (%)

Net government
cost ($ billions)

(1)
lower
bound

(2)
upper
bound

(3)
lower
bound

(4)
upper
bound

(5)
lower
bound

(6)
upper
bound

a. Hedonic imputation of
employer contribution

3.3

21.6

4.9

32.4

1.9

9.8

b. BLS imputation of
employer contribution

7.4

35.4

11.1

53.2

5.5

22.0

2) Covered by private
nonemployer insuranceb

50.0

90.0

10.4

18.6

9.5

17.1

3.3

6.7

0.6

1.3

−2.2

−4.9

17.5

28.3

7.7

12.5

7.4

9.7

—

—

Group
1) Covered by employerprovided group insurancea

4) those currently uninsured.
For each group, we specify an
equation for the tax credit take-up rate—
the probability of a person accepting the
tax credit. We also vary each take-up rate
equation so as to give a lower-bound and
an upper-bound take-up rate for each
group.
For individuals currently covered
by employer-provided group health
insurance, we assume a lower-bound
elasticity of take-up with respect to the
subsidy provided by the tax credit of
0.625 (relatively unresponsive behavior)
and an upper-bound elasticity of inﬁnity
(that is, a worker with employerprovided health insurance accepts the
credit whenever he or she would incur
lower expenses by doing so). For those
currently covered by private nonemployer
health insurance, the lower-bound
assumption is that 50 percent would
take up the credit, and the upper-bound
assumption is that 90 percent would take
up the credit.
For those currently covered by
Medicaid, we assume an elasticity of
take-up with respect to the credit subsidy
of 0.2. We then obtain lower-bound
estimates of the take-up rate by imputing
(or assigning) health insurance costs
and expenditures to an entire family,
and upper-bound estimates by imputing
costs and expenditures to each individual
separately. For currently uninsured
families and individuals, we assume
the probability of taking up the credit
depends on income and the size of the
subsidy, with an elasticity of take-up with
respect to the subsidy of 0.625. Lowerand upper-bound take-up rates again
come from imputing health insurance
costs and expenditures to an entire family
and to each individual separately.

Number of
individuals accepting
(millions)

3) Covered by Medicaidc
4) Uninsured
Total

c

23.6–29.8 64.8–85.6 16.6–85.6 31.7–43.9

For individuals covered by employer-provided group health insurance, lower-bound simulations assume
an elasticity of take-up with respect to the tax subsidy of 0.625; upper-bound simulations are based on the
assumption that all workers who would reduce their expenses by switching to private insurance do so. The
alternative simulations for individuals covered by employer-provided insurance are based on two alternative
imputations of the worker’s contribution to employer-provided group health insurance.
b
For individuals covered by private nonemployer insurance, lower-bound simulations are based on the
assumption that 50 percent of covered individuals accept the tax credit; upper-bound simulations are based on
the assumption that 90 percent accept the tax credit.
c
For individuals covered by Medicaid and for uninsured individuals, lower-bound simulations are based on
the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made for entire families; upper-bound simulations
are based on the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made individually.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
a

The simulations are based on the
March 1999 annual demographic ﬁle of
the Current Population Survey (CPS),
which has data on 132,324 individuals
under age 65. We supplement the CPS
with the 1999 Survey of EmployerSponsored Health Beneﬁts, conducted
by the Kaiser Family Foundation and
the Health Research and Education Trust
because the March CPS does not include
data on the health insurance premiums
paid by employers, or on employees’
contributions for employer-provided
insurance.
What the Simulations Suggest
Table 1 displays the main results of the
simulation model outlined above—takeup rates (columns 1 and 2), the number
of individuals accepting the tax credit
(columns 3 and 4), and the government’s
net cost of a refundable tax credit
(columns 5 and 6). Except for those

already covered by private insurance, the
ﬁgures reﬂect the number of individuals
who switch from their current health
insurance status to private nonemployer
insurance.
For individuals currently covered
by employer-provided group health
insurance, the simulations yield a
broad range of take-up rates—from
3.3 to 35.4 percent, depending on the
underlying assumptions. Simulated
ranges for the number of individuals
who would switch from employerprovided to private insurance (5–53
million) and for the government’s tax
expenditures on this group ($1.9–$22
billion) are correspondingly broad. The
lower-bound estimate of 3.3 percent is
very close to Gruber’s estimate of 3.2
percent, suggesting we have succeeded in
replicating Gruber’s simulations.
For individuals covered by private
nonemployer insurance, the take-up rate
is assumed to be 50 percent (the lower-
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bound) or 90 percent (the upper-bound).
The implication is that between 10.4 and
18.6 million privately insured individuals
would accept the tax credit, and that
government expenditures on tax credits to
these individuals would range from $9.5
to $17 billion (row 3 of Table 1).
For individuals covered by Medicaid,
the simulation model gives a take-up
rate of between 3.3 and 6.7 percent,
which implies that between 0.6 and
1.3 million current Medicaid recipients
would switch to private insurance (row
4 of Table 1). Net government costs
for those initially covered by Medicaid
actually fall by $2.2–$4.9 billion
because it is less expensive to subsidize
private nonemployer insurance for these
individuals than to provide them with
Medicaid.
For the uninsured, the simulations
yield a lower-bound take-up rate of 17.5
percent and an upper-bound take-up
rate of 28.3 percent. It follows that the
tax credit would reduce the number of
uninsured by 7.7–12.5 million—from
about 44 million (or 18.4 percent of the
nonelderly U.S. population) to between
31.5 and 36.3 million (or between 13.2
and 15.2 percent). Gruber’s take-up rate
(and the corresponding reduction in the
uninsured population) is somewhat lower
than our lower-bound estimate, but we
come close to replicating his ﬁndings.
The simulations suggest that tax
credit expenditures on those who were
previously uninsured would be between
$7.4 and $9.7 billion—or between $776
and $961 per newly insured person.
However, the net government cost of
the tax credit ranges from about $16.6
to nearly $44 billion because the credit
can be used by groups other than the
previously uninsured. If the low end of
the range ($16.6 billion) pertains, then
the average cost to insure a previously
uninsured person under the tax credit
would be just over $2,100. However, if
the high end ($43.9 billion) pertains, then
the average cost per previously uninsured
person would be about $3,500.
Discussion
What do we learn from these
simulations? Our replications and
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extensions of Gruber’s (2000a,b)
simulations suggest that a refundable tax
credit of $1,000 for a single individual
or $2,000 for a family for private health
insurance would reduce the number
of uninsured individuals by between
17.5 and 28 percent and require new
government expenditures of between
$16.6 and $44 billion, of which about
$7.4–$9.7 billion would be for coverage
of previously uninsured individuals.
Clearly, these wide simulated ranges
highlight the uncertainty inherent in
modeling the effects of health insurance
tax credits. Pauly, Song, and Herring
(2001) point to model speciﬁcation and
assumptions about the premiums faced
by the uninsured as the main sources of
uncertainty. These add up to uncertainty
about individual and family take-up
rates, and, as they write, “this uncertainty
... should be front and center in the
evaluation of tax credit schemes since we
as analysts have minimal experience with
large subsidies directed at low-income
individuals.” In addition, some tax credit
proposals could lead to broader changes
in health insurance markets, such as
greater price competition among insurers.
This is yet another source of uncertainty
in modeling tax credit proposals.
The next question is whether direct
empirical evidence could reduce
uncertainty about tax credit take-up rates.
Remler, Rachlin, and Glied (2001) and
Currie (2004) have reviewed evidence
on the take-up of a wide variety of social
programs and show that take-up rates
vary greatly from program to program.
Their reviews suggest that little basis
exists for choosing a most likely point
estimate from the range of simulated
take-up rates shown in Table 1—the
lower-bound estimates in column 1 of
Table 1 may well be too low, and the
upper-bound estimates in column 2 may
be optimistically high, but little more can
be said.
Obtaining convincing empirical
evidence on take-up of a health insurance
tax credit will not be cheap—it may
require a demonstration project or social
experiment. But progress on the issue
of tax credits for health insurance will
require improved evidence on the likely
take-up rate of a credit, and the time and

expense of such a demonstration may
well be justiﬁed if it leads to convincing
estimates of how tax credits would expand
coverage and what they would cost.
David W. Emmons is Director of the Center for
Health Policy Research at the American Medical
Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Eva Madly is a research analyst at the W.E.
Upjohn Institute.
Stephen A. Woodbury is a professor of
economics at Michigan State University and a
senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute.
This article reﬂects the opinions of the authors
and should not be interpreted as representing the
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